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REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS OF FAILING BANKS
Abstract
Abstract
Since the Great Depression and the stock market crash in 1929, the global economy has experienced immersive development. This paper will analyze the effects of the involvement of governments in rescuing failing banks through different methodological tools. The purpose of this research is to fill the gap that exists in the literature on these issues and raise awareness of the moral hazard that is increasing over time world-widely. Findings and evidence are presented from one of the methods used to discuss the government stance and/or whether the government should intervene in the period of crisis. After presenting the arguments, the application and usefulness of this paper to data collection will be presented in relatable content.
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References
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